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 Conflict Intervention and Protracted Settlements:  Policy (Un)Learning and the 
Cyprus – EU Debacle 
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The article examines why a comprehensive settlement to resolve the Cyprus problem has 
yet to be reached despite the existence of a positive incentive structure and the proactive 
involvement of regional and international organizations, including the European Union 
and the United Nations. To address this question, we draw evidence from critical turning 
points in foreign policy decision-making in Turkey, Greece and the two communities in 
Cyprus. We emphasize the role of hegemonic political discourses arguing that the latter 
have prevented an accurate evaluation of incentives that could have set the stage for a 
constructive settlement. However, despite the political debacle, success stories have 
emerged, such as the reactivation of the Committee for Missing Persons (CMP), a 
defunct body for almost 25 years, to become the most successful bi-communal project 
following Cyprus’ EU accession. We evaluate contradictory evidence in the Cypriot 
peace process and identify policy lessons to be learned from the CMP ‘success story’.  
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The article explains why peace negotiations in Cyprus problem have failed in the past 
decade despite the proactive involvement of prestigious international clubs, such as the 
European Union (EU) and the United Nations (UN). It examines the role of external 
agents and considers how international mediators have attempted to transform the 
incentives for the main actors in the negotiations of the past decade. The article combines 
insights gleaned from the study of elite framing and political learning with a rational 
choice perspective, identifying how external actors, political elites, and leaders have 
conceived major issues in the Cypriot negotiations, and how they have communicated 
compromises to their local constituencies. We argue that although it could be assumed 
that all players would have been better off with a settlement, well-entrenched domestic 
political discourses prevented an accurate reassessment of new incentives that could have 
set the stage for a solution. The Cypriot stalemate is relevant in understanding how 
societies either manage to mitigate protracted conflicts or alternatively fail to deal with 
intractable patterns of confrontation; in fact, knowing why peace processes fail in the 
Middle East and elsewhere can be just as valuable as understanding why they succeed.   
When we take into consideration the vigorous involvement of international 
institutions and the ‘stagnant’ status of the conflict over the last 35 years, the fact that the 
Cyprus problem has yet to be resolved is puzzling. Since the first inter-communal wave 
of violence on the island (1963-1967) and the de facto partition of Cyprus in 1974, the 
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UN has developed a proactive agenda, ranging from peacekeeping (UNFICYP) to 
brokering peace settlement initiatives. More recently (in the past two decades), the EU 
emerged as a new player able to use soft power to ‘catalyze’ a peace settlement. Still, 
despite the involvement of these influential international institutions the island remains 
divided. Furthermore, the Cyprus conflict has been labelled as a ‘frozen conflict’ (Nugent 
2000; Heraclides 2006) with virtually no human casualties for almost four decades. The 
absence of physical violence should have been conducive for a peace settlement since 
unlike other deeply divided societies, a generation of Cypriots has grown up with almost 
no direct exposure to violence. But despite the existence of conditions favourable for a 
solution, a peace settlement has yet to be reached.  
Nonetheless, a number of surprising ‘success stories’ in the island offer relevant 
lessons to other post-conflict societies, highlighting the agency of local actors in shaping 
successful transformation. The most remarkable success story concerns the Committee on 
Missing Persons (CMP). Defunct for almost 25 years, it resumed its activities in 2004 to 
become the island’s most successful bi-communal project. By contributing to the 
exhumation of 663 human remains by June 2010 (CMP 2010), the CMP has been 
described not only as a success story for Cyprus but also as an example for other societies 
in the Middle East specifically Lebanon (Jaquemet, 2009). As its recent developments 
show, a successful resolution of prickly issues is possible despite the absence of an 
overall political settlement. Examining positive transformations is central in 
understanding what leads societies away from decades-long stalemates and intractable 
conflicts. More specifically, the ‘success story’ of the CMP provides an instructive 
example of how conflict mediation can be also effective in addressing humanitarian 
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issues in post-conflict settings even in situations where a political settlement has not been 
reached. These external normative stimuli are often critical in empowering local agency; 
they are frequently better suited in designing flexible grassroots strategies to address 
intractable human rights problems (see Rishmond’s contribution in this issue). Although 
the dichotomy between humanitarian and political issues could be criticized for 
downplaying interlinkages between the two levels of analysis, it could be argued that 
regional or international organizations frequently prioritize issues of major humanitarian 
concern over political issues.  
The article evaluates the Cypriot peace process by focusing on three distinct 
periods in the past decade: the pre-2002/3 period preceding the decision of the EU to 
confirm Cypriot accession; the abortive Annan referendums in 2004 (outvoted by the 
Greek Cypriot community) and their immediate aftermath; as well as the renewed post-
2008 talks led by former Australian Minister of Foreign Affairs Alexander Downer under 
UN auspices. These three periods have significant differences in incentives and 
disincentives facing major actors in the negotiations and in leadership styles and 
preferences, in both Cyprus and the two ‘motherlands’, Greece and Turkey. This 
variation in background conditions could help analyze the complex interplay between 
incentives and framing as well as the role of political learning in post-conflict societies. 
The article justifies its conclusions by drawing evidence from several turning points in 
critical decision-making processes in the past decade among all relevant actors. 
We begin by highlighting the broader theoretical issues before turning to the pre-
2003 period, explaining the positions adopted by the two motherlands and the two 
Cypriot communities. We then engage with the failure of the Annan Plan and its 
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immediate aftermath, explaining why the EU ‘catalyzing’ effect failed to bring about a 
solution. We argue that EU policies not only depended on the incentive structure offered 
to the parties in conflict but on how these incentives and challenges were framed in the 
mainstream political discourse of Greece and Turkey and the two Cypriot communities. 
We argue that rational choice approaches emphasizing institutional change and incentives 
could fruitfully be enhanced by the insights offered by studies into political learning and 
elite framing which focus on how leaders make compromises acceptable to the broad 
membership of their constituencies. We end by looking at the transformation of the CMP 
from a previously inoperative body into the most successful bi-communal project in 
Cyprus. This ‘success story’ offers policy and theory insights into how the normative 
influence of the EU has the potential to transform local ownership into a catalytic force of 
grassroots rapprochement. 
 
Institutional Incentives and Framing 
In their attempt to demonstrate the conditions for cooperative play, rational choice 
theorists provide conceptual approaches, theories, and models that shed light on the 
outcomes of interactions among the goal-directed, rational behaviours of actors (Fearon 
1995; Posen 1993). Conventional wisdom assumes that cooperation will occur when the 
rewards for cooperation are high, when sanctions for non-cooperation are steep, and 
when it is not beneficial to outmanoeuvre an ‘adversary’ with whom one expects to deal 
over a prolonged period. We argue that the logic of EU engagement in Cyprus, especially 
the decisions made at the Helsinki Summit for Cyprus and Turkey in 1999, appear to be 
grounded on this reasoning. Yet explanations focusing exclusively on incentives have 
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failed to convincingly account for the central paradox, namely, that rational actors should 
have already reached a settlement rather than maintaining a costly conflict with unknown 
consequences for the future of the island.  
Cognitive approaches supplement the study of incentives by focusing on 
discourses, frames or simplified mental representations of reality that decision-makers 
use to interpret events and to choose among multiple courses of action (Tetlock 
1998:876). By rendering events or occurrences meaningful, frames organize experience 
and guide action, whether individually or collectively. According to Bert Klandermas, 
framing is a process in which social actors, media, and members of a society jointly 
interpret, define, and redefine states of affairs (Klandermans 1997:44). The evolution of 
new cognitive habits determines what is considered possible or impossible, natural or 
unnatural, problematic or inevitable (Lustick 1993:36). As in the case of ordinary picture 
frames, cognitive frames reflect existing public perceptions of reality but restrict certain 
realities from people’s public attention. Like picture frames, they focus attention “by 
bracketing what in our sensual field is relevant and what is irrelevant, what is ‘in frame’ 
and what is ‘out-of-frame’ in relation to the object of orientation” (Snow, forthcoming). 
Cognitive frames also rely heavily on the use of analogies from the past. Jervis maintains 
that analogies provide a useful shortcut to rationality by making accessible insights 
derived from previous events (Jervis 1976:220).  
In the study of protracted peace processes, non-adversarial frames that support 
cooperative policies compete openly with confrontational frames (O’Leary and McGarry 
1993). On the one hand, the latter assume that a community in conflict should fight 
against an unjust situation and is capable of doing so. On the other hand, the former focus 
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on the luck of sustainability of confrontational policies, the presence of social, economic, 
and political alternatives, and the value of negotiated compromises. Peacemakers and 
hardliners compete through their framing on the value, efficiency, and legitimacy of 
proffered policies, whether confrontational or conflicting. 
Failures of confrontational frames in foreign policy, frequently open windows of 
opportunity for the introduction of cooperative frames in the domestic political discourse 
(see diagram I).  The new cooperative frames rely on past analogies, political learning 
from recent crises, and dissatisfaction resulting from the costs and consequences of 
confrontational politics. According to the definition of political learning, offered by 
Nancy Bermeo, learning ‘is the process through which people modify their political 
beliefs and tactics as a result of severe crises, frustrations, and dramatic changes in 
environment’ (1992:274). Taking into consideration that major ‘crises force people to re-
evaluate the ideas that they have used as guides to action in the past’, failures in foreign 
policy act as turning points which frequently lead to changes in the priorities, tactics and 
strategies deployed by a ‘critical mass’ of learners (ibid: 276). The new frames, emerging 
as a product of this learning process, are ingrained in mainstream discourse, first, by 
legitimizing public discussion of cooperative alternatives as a credible and sensible 
choice, and second, by marginalizing threats to the regime’s stability if cooperative shifts 
in foreign policy take place (Lustick 1993:46). An overlapping argument has been put 
forward by the emerging literature on EU’s ‘normative means’ in conflict resolution, 
where the concept of learning is pivotal in transforming perceived interests or even 
collective identities (Diez et al 2006:569-575; Rumelili 2004; Tocci 2008:15-16 and 
2007:15). Learning experience, particularly the ability to identify cause-and-effect 
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relationships, is the key to assessing the expected consequences of alternative courses of 
action proffered by conflicting confrontational and cooperative frames (George 1991). 
Intra-group competition and preferences of individual leaders and coalitions might have 





Graph I: Schematic presentation of adaptation process 
 
 
‘Framing Cyprus’ in the pre-EU Accession Era 
In the pre-2002-2003 period it was expected that an external powerful peacemaker, 
similar to the role of the US in the Northern Irish peace process in mid-1990s (see 
Guelke’s contribution), would have had a similar catalyzing effect to the solution of the 
protracted Cyprus problem. In essence, EU engagement in Cyprus was based on the 
expectation that all actors would collaborate in reaching a settlement without one side 
being held hostage to the intransigence of the other. For instance, although it was an 
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extremely important ‘carrot’, Cyprus’s accession to the EU was not conditional (i.e., 
made subject to a settlement), since such a precondition would have disproportionately 
empowered the Turkish side with a veto right, making the Greek Cypriot community pay 
the cost of potential Turkish intransigence.1More importantly, during pre-accession 
negotiations Greece had threatened to veto the accession of Central and East European 
countries, if Cyprus’s accession was put on hold (Nugent, 2000: 134). Although the 
cooperation of Ankara was also essential, the solution of the Cyprus problem per se was 
not a precondition for Turkey’s accession. In accordance with this logic, as negotiated in 
Helsinki in 1999, all parties should have had enough incentives to cooperate without 
being penalized on outsiders’ intransigence. More importantly, the political costs for any 
party perceived to block the UN Secretary General’s efforts to broker a solution should 
have been substantial.     
 
Discourse in ‘Motherlands’ 
In any discussion of cooperative play in the above scenarios, it is important to examine 
how international factors played out in political discourse. For example, the question of 
whether the EU logic offered a promising opportunity structure is irrelevant if one of the 
two sides did not perceive it as promising. How the EU framed the incentives and 
challenges of enlargement had to be compatible with how they were absorbed by the 
political discourses of Greece and Turkey, since countries both had the capacity to 
influence (even determine) the actions of their kin communities in Cyprus.  
                                                            
1 For the relevant EU enlargement documents see: http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/intro/ 
criteria.htm; http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/turkey/pdf/ap_turk_en.pdf. 
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More specifically for Greece, the framing of policies depended on the learning 
experiences of previous crises, either with Turkey or within the European Union. We 
argue below that despite the prevalence of confrontational politics in Greece through the 
1990s, its pre-2002-03 political discourse was increasingly in line with the shared norms 
of fellow EU members. This same tendency entered the Greek Cypriot discourse just 
before Cyprus’ accession to the EU. Greek and Greek Cypriot adaptation to EU norms 
during this period was set in motion, to some extent, by a gradual process of political 
learning which began with Greece’s accession to the EU. 
We stress the word ‘gradual’, as the process of political learning in Greece did not 
take place immediately after the country’s accession to the EU. Despite its early 
European membership, Greece did not translate its membership into successful 
negotiation outcomes in its Turkish or Balkan foreign policy issues. Rather, in the years 
following its EU accession, Greece suffered repeated failures in the Cypriot negotiations 
and faced major near-war situations with Turkey in 1987 and 1996 in the Aegean.  In the 
mainstream Greek political discourse, these crises and policy failures were addressed by 
pointing to Turkey’s intransigence and aggression, along with the ‘preferential’ position 
the latter enjoyed in ‘Western eyes’ (Heraclides 2001). Greek policies also minimized EU 
solidarity and helped antagonize Ankara, while Greece’s own responsibilities were 
underemphasized in the mid-1990s. In line with this cognitive frame, Greece followed 
policies of limited cooperation, not only on Greek-Turkish issues but on Turkey’s 
Kurdish question and the new challenges emerging after the dissolution of Yugoslavia, 
particularly the Macedonian issue. 2 The presence of a vibrant nationalist constituency in 
                                                            
2 For a dedicated database analyzing domestic and foreign policy crises involving Greece and Turkey with 
their neighbors and ethnic minorities  see http://www.qub.ac.uk/research-
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Greece, the maintenance of victimization narratives, and the confidence in the efficacy of 
nationalist politics helped maintain this confrontational frame until the end of the 1990s 
(Heraclides 2001; Millas 2001). 
 Nonetheless, this confrontational cognitive frame began to crumple when Greece 
did not achieve positive policy outcomes in a number of crises. Two episodes in the 
1990s demonstrated the pitfalls, contradictions, and counterproductive nature of 
confrontational framing. In the first episode, Greece failed to prevail in its dispute with 
the nascent Macedonian/FYROM Republic. Despite being a member in prestigious 
international forums, such as the EU and NATO, Greece received only short-term support 
from its allies and partners; more importantly, it was subject to intense disapproval over 
its lack of moderation. In the second episode, the failure by certain branches of the Greek 
state to protect Abdullah Öcalan, the PKK leader, in 1998-1999 showed the dangers of 
confrontational politics for Greece. Antagonizing Turkey during extensive public protests 
of what was perceived as outside support for terrorism proved to be extremely risky. 
Ironically, these episodes facilitated the effort to marginalize nationalist frames (and 
framers), as they were threatening not only for the national interests of Greece but for the 
incumbency of existing political actors.  
 The growing public debates on the advantages of disengagement from 
confrontational politics, paved the way for a new cognitive paradigm of cooperative 
politics in Greece. Gradually it became conventional wisdom that unless Greece 
cooperated and coordinated its policies with fellow EU members’ principles and interests, 
it would never enjoy the full political advantages of being a member state. Soon after the 




Öcalan crisis, George Papandreou, an advocate of Greek-Turkish cooperation, was 
appointed to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and enjoyed high levels of popular support 
in the Greek polls leading to his election as Prime Minister in 2009 (To Vima 2001). The 
change towards cooperative politics was subtly supported by the main opposition party as 
well (Couloumbis 1998). The general adoption of cooperative frames facilitated 
landmark decisions, such as the historic reversal in Greek policies to support Turkey as 
an EU applicant member, the improvement of minority relations in Greece, and the 
ongoing rapprochement between Greek and Turkish governments.  
 The evolution of political discourse in Greece matched and reinforced similar 
tendencies in the Greek Cypriot community. Following the events of 1974, the Greek 
Cypriot community established strong economic and democratic institutions while trying 
actively to seek the reunification of the island within the framework of the 1977-79 
agreements which set parameters for federalizing Cyprus. During this period, all major 
political parties gradually consented to a general peace framework, despite some 
disagreements on how exactly a federation would be established. The shift towards 
cooperative politics in Greece facilitated the emergence of reconciliatory voices in the 
Greek Cypriot community, especially as all political parties recognized the importance of 
reaching consensus with Greece.  
Finally, once Greece realized the importance of securing EU solidarity, the 
country lobbied for Turkey’s accession. The argument was that the more plausible and 
attractive its entry, the more likely Turkey was to comply with its Greek-related 
obligations. It was also anticipated that given Greek’s status as an EU member state, with 
the admission of Cyprus into the EU, the Greek Cypriot community would be in an 
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advantageous position in peace negotiations (Nugent, 2000: 138). This fact should have 
alerted Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots to exploit the opportunities of cooperation before 
2003.  
 
Turkey and the ‘Politics of Antagonism’  
The situation in Turkey was more complex than in Greece in terms of its adaptability to 
EU norms in the years preceding Cypriot accession. To begin with, consecutive Turkish 
governments failed to decode clear signals in the 1990s of a forthcoming Cypriot 
accession or (as in the case of Greece) it accredited any Cypriot progress in EU 
negotiations to the ‘preferential’ position Greece enjoyed in the ‘Western’ eyes. Turkey 
and the Turkish Cypriots did not engage in negotiations until the very last minute in late 
2002; even then, the general perception was that they were ambivalent about making 
constructive moves in the negotiation process, violating the agreed-upon federal 
framework and demanding confederation instead (Demsey 2002; Nugent, 2000: 135; 
Turkish Daily News 2002b). These policies convinced European leaders that Greek 
Cypriots could not be penalized in their accession prospects because of Turkish Cypriot 
intransigence. Such positions further consolidated a European consensus in favour of 
Greek Cypriot accession even without a peace settlement. Moreover, before and even 
during the negotiations, Turkey threatened to annex the northern part of Cyprus (BBC 
2002; Kohen 2001; Manisali 2001). The argument of annexation was an unsuitable 
negotiation tool for Turkey, however, as the threat lacked credibility and caused enduring 
harm to Turkey’s own accession prospects.  
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 What explains the predominance of non-cooperative policies in Turkey?  First, 
Turkey did not fully appreciate the overly high cost of confrontational policy-making in 
the evolving European context. In fact, because of a number of ‘successful’ experiences 
of confrontational politics in the past, the use of escalatory rhetoric regarding Cyprus (or 
elsewhere) remained entrenched in the country’s mainstream political discourse. On 
several occasions in the 1990s Turkey successfully deployed an antagonistic profile with 
friends and foes alike (Barkey and Gordon 2001). For instance, in 1998, a Turkish 
ultimatum forced Syria to give up its decade-old support for the Kurdish PKK and its 
leader Abdullah Öcalan. On other occasions, by triggering popular nationalist 
mobilizations, Turkey prevented US Senate resolutions on the Armenian genocide issue 
(2000) and Italian support for the PKK-leadership (1998). In addition, Turkey 
‘successfully’ convinced Greece that actions such as the installation of Russian-made 
missiles in Cyprus (1998) and the expansion of Greek territorial waters could provoke or 
justify war (casus belli). Finally, in the 1996 Imia-Kardak crisis, Turkey successfully 
challenged Greek sovereignty over two uninhabited Aegean islets. Hence, the annexation 
threat mentioned above was preceded by several episodes of ‘successful’ confrontation, 
consolidating a dominant frame where Turkish threats against the Greek Cypriots were 
seen as normal, justifiable, and credible.  
Leaders’ legacies, party preferences, and the political structure in Turkey 
favoured the maintenance of this frame until 2002. While in Greece, the political system 
allowed stable single party governments, forming governments in Turkey involved as 
many as three parties, and required the subtle consent of the military. PM Bulent Ecevit 
owed his political legacy to the events of 1974 in Cyprus while his coalition partner, the 
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Nationalist Action Party (MHP), campaigned openly on confrontational politics, speaking 
against any concession on ‘nationally sensitive’ issues, including Cyprus (Turkish Daily 
News 2002a). Meanwhile, the military was torn between its aspiration to make the 
country more western and European, and the apparent value of Cyprus for the security of 
the Turkish mainland (Kazan 2002).3  
 
Turkey and the ‘Politics of Cooperation’ 
Despite these constraints in decision making, a shift towards cooperative politics in 
Turkey became possible after 2002. Unlike previous crises, it became obvious that on this 
occasion, Turkey could not lean on the United States or any major European country for 
support (Barkey and Gordon 2002b). Rather, with the moderate leadership of the early 
2000s in Greece – the most cooperative for decades – and with fellow EU members 
acknowledging this, any crisis in Cyprus would be attributed to Turkey.  
Furthermore, since Turkey’s cooperation on Cyprus had become mandatory for its 
EU accession, a number of influential civic and political groups suggested that the major 
orientation of the country should not be subordinated to Turkey’s failing policies in 
Cyprus. These groups enjoyed the backing of a large part of the economic and liberal 
establishment as well as the overwhelming support the pro-European Turkish public.4  
Advocates of moderate policies criticized confrontational policies; using methods similar 
to those employed in Greece, they pointed out the cost and lack of efficacy of such 
policies in Cyprus. Influential opinion-makers in the media argued that as well as 
                                                            
3For a detailed analysis of Turkish security discourse on Cyprus see Isil Kazan “Cyprus and the Eastern 
Mediterranean, seen from Turkey” in Thomas Diez Ed. The European Union and the Cyprus Conflict.  
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delaying Turkey’s own accession, Turkey’s lack of cooperation on the issue made 
Cyprus’ accession to the EU irreversible (Birand 2001; Kohen 2001). Finally, after the 
August 1999 earthquake, media and civil society networks improved the image of Greece 
in Turkey, thereby enhancing relations between the two nations. For the first time, the 
Greek and Turkish ministries of Foreign Affairs set up a Liaison Committee working 
with NGOs to support joint activities; the civil society network grew rapidly to more than 
800 organizations making it impossible for either country’s ministry to monitor Greek-
Turkish rapprochement.5  
These developments enabled a shift towards cooperative politics after the 2002 
parliamentary elections in Turkey. A gradual process of transformation took place 
simultaneously in both Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot community, each reinforcing the 
other. The Justice and Development Party (AKP) of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan launched 
‘fresh and constructive diplomatic initiatives’on previously dormant issues, such as the 
Cyprus problem (Abramowitz and Barkey 2009:119).  Although a party with origins in 
Islam, AKP represented a wide coalition of moderate forces in Turkey, including non-
radical Islamists, moderate Kurds, and mainstream centre-right and liberal forces who 
aimed to secure and strengthen the country economically and politically at a global level.  
Having secured a single-party government in 2002, AKP could invest in its long term-
vision, breaking away from dependency on the politics of antagonism.  
 Closely related to the developments in Turkey, Turkish-Cypriot civil society 
mobilized massively in the years from 2001 to 2004 in support of the reunification plan 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
4 The Turkish Union of Industrialist was probably the best example of a civic organization thinking and 
acting in this direction. For popular attitudes in Turkey towards EU at that period see Candidate countries 
Eurobarometer  at http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/cceb/cceb20011_en.pdf 
5 See interview advisor to MFA Nikitas Lionarakis, November 2001.  
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that could enable members of both communities to reap the benefits of EU membership. 
Disenchantment with the growing dependency of northern Cyprus on Turkey, in 
combination with the economic prospects of EU membership, resulted in demonstrations 
in 2002 and the election of political leaders with a clearly pro-EU agenda. More 
importantly, the Bu Memleket Bizim (‘this is our own country’) [Cyprus] platform 
successfully mobilized thousands of Turkish Cypriots to protest Denktaş and support 
opposition parties (Jansen 2000; Smith 2001). Although Turkey and the Turkish-Cypriot 
authorities failed initially to translate these developments into tangible policy outcomes, a 
remarkable volte face occurred in 2004, culminating in an impressive 65% ‘yes’ vote in 
favour of the Annan Plan 
 Still, in the same referendum, the Greek-Cypriot community voted down the 
Annan Plan with a resounding 76%. What accounts for this reverse transformation? The 
EU as a ‘catalyst’ influenced the previously intransigent parties, namely Turkey and the 
Turkish-Cypriots while the Greek-Cypriots moved at the same time in the other direction 
– going from initial cooperation to rejecting the Annan Plan. We point to two factors: the 
reckless design of the EU incentives structure; and the domination of elite discourse by 
confrontational frames which effectively narrowed the Greek-Cypriot conception of 
national interest within the EU. 
 
Design of Annan Plan Referendum Incentives 
In the 2002 Copenhagen Summit, the EU decided to accept the Republic of Cyprus as a 
member-state, even in the absence of an overall solution to the Cyprus problem. 
Following this decision, the EU could no longer synchronize the EU-orientation of the 
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Republic of Cyprus with the peace initiatives of the Secretary General, Kofi Annan to 
enhance the prospects of a successful settlement.  
Granting unconditional accession to the EU gave the ‘carrot’ of EU membership 
to the Greek-Cypriot community without any potential ‘stick’ in the case of their possible 
disengagement from the political settlement. In rational choice terms, both the rewards 
for cooperation and the penalties for non-cooperation were minimal for the Greek-
Cypriot community in the post Copenhagen period, making the option of ‘non-
cooperation’ a tempting alternative (Heraclides 2006; Richmond 2005). EU membership 
not only improved the security of the Republic of Cyprus against Turkish expansionism 
but enhanced the international legitimacy of the Republic. Most significantly, in the 
aftermath of accession, the Greek-Cypriots were in an advantageous position to negotiate 
with Turkey, given the veto right of EU member-states over any prospective candidate.  
A significant number of Greek and Greek Cypriot constituencies remained 
committed to the politics of cooperation, arguing that with accession, the Greek side 
would be in better position to pursue a viable settlement. However, these constituencies 
assumed a minority position when Glafkos Clerides (DISY) and George Papandreou 
(PASOK) lost the elections in Cyprus (2003) and Greece (2004) respectively.  Newly 
elected Greek President Tassos Papadopoulos felt free to pursue a maximalist agenda, 
given the negotiating advantage. Meanwhile, Greek PM Kostas Karamanlis lacked the 
experience or the leadership style to influence Greek Cypriot politics. In the 2004 
referendum, he nominally supported the Annan Plan but did little to promote it among 
Greek Cypriots for fear of damaging his relationship with the conservative grassroots of 
his own party. Karamanlis also feared that imposing a settlement would lead to 
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accusations of a ‘second Zurich’, a reference to the failure of his late uncle to achieve a 
viable settlement over Cyprus in 1959.6 The simultaneous change in Greek and Cyprus 
governments triggered a self-reinforcing process of policy unlearning in both countries as 
most influential participants in the accession and Cyprus problem negotiations found 
themselves in the opposition.   
Yet a significant portion of the Greek and Greek-Cypriot leadership campaigned 
in favour of the Annan plan initially and subsequently remained committed to 
intensifying bicommunal negotiations. Since 2004 DISY, the main Greek Cypriot 
opposition party, holds the view that the continuous stalemate in Cyprus brings the island 
closer to a permanent division, a process that could only be reversed through closer 
cooperation between the Cypriot government and its European partners. 7 The post-2002-
03 tensions within the Greek-Cypriot community demonstrate that incentives can lead to 
vastly different learning and policy outcomes. Although for Clerides and his followers, 
EU incentives constituted a satisfactory basis for negotiation because of the benefits of a 
settlement for both communities, Papadopoulos saw the same incentives as undesirable.  
In his seminal study on the foreign policy of small states, Keohane notes that the 
latter adapt their policies more easily to their external environment since moderation 
often secures them from perceived or real threats by larger states (Keohane 1969).  Yet 
the case of Cyprus under Papadopoulos suggests that even in small states, foreign policy 
may not be primarily influenced by external influences/incentives per se, but by the 
ability of elites to control, frame, and utilize external opportunities for domestic purposes. 
                                                            
6 Zurich is the point of reference against negotiating a settlement with Turkey; see for instance, Greek 
Parliamentary Debates, October 23, 1980, p. 739. 
7 See main opposition DISY Leader, Nikos Anastasiades (2007). Republic of Cyprus-Parliament Debates, 
July 15. 
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Moreover, the Cypriot case demonstrates how small state (mis)adaptation within the EU 
might be an inadvertent outcome of accession to the Union (see also Nugent, 2006). 
Small state policies are of critical importance for European security particularly, if EU 
security policies prove to be insufficient in securing even the territorial integrity of these 
member states.  
Although strong incentives to cooperate existed even in the aftermath of the 
failure of the Annan plan, negotiations had no tangible outcome. As will be argued 
below, the ‘adversarial framing’ adopted by Papadopoulos accounted – to a significant 
extent – for the failure of 2004. More significantly, its legacy entrapped following leaders 
who became reluctant to reach a settlement.  
 
Framing Incentives after the 2004 Referendum 
National interests are neither fixed nor exogenously given, making it important to 
investigate the processes by which the conception of ‘interests’ is constructed. Therefore, 
the study of elite framing and how ‘opportunities’ are framed is of fundamental 
importance. As Diez et al. have illustrated, the impact of the EU is not automatic; the 
existence of a positive incentives structure does not necessarily mean positive 
transformation since ‘the actual use made of integration and association ultimately 
depends on how these (dis-)incentives by the EU played out in domestic context’ (Diez et 
al 2008:11). As the experience of other deeply divided societies has shown, a significant 
challenge of political elites is to convince their population to engage in new 
consociational/federal arrangements. Frequently, such endeavours are impeded by the 
tendency to draw false analogies with (failed) experiences from their own past or with 
unsuccessful contemporary examples of neighbouring countries. Framing such analogies 
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often shapes common (mis)understandings on the fairness and viability of peace 
compromises particularly controversial federal and power-sharing arrangements, leading 
to a society’s institutional entrapment when such compromises are desirable and 
necessary.  
 Hence, a caveat should be highlighted. Rational choice, political learning and 
framing should not be treated as mutually exclusive approaches. In fact, the study of the 
2004 referendum shows that instrumental political learning matters most when the 
ambiguity in public discourse offers several competing frames in mainstream public 
discourse. It is primarily under these circumstances that people count most on past 
experiences in order to make sense of a complex political reality or a pressing dilemma. 
Subsequently framing is more influential in decision-making, in situations where 
incentives are framed by different (groups of) people in different ways.  
It could be argued that the ‘adversarial’ framing adopted by the Greek-Cypriot 
elites in the period preceding the 2004 referendum informed the rejection of the Annan 
plan. As mentioned above a primary function of adversarial framing is that is narrows the 
definition of national interests and priorities. Once a specific construction of reality was 
set in the Cypriot peace process, the room for manoeuvring shrunk, political learning and 
the evaluation of positive aspects of the Annan plan for the Greek-Cypriot community 
ceased, and the effort to negotiate for further gains was dismissed. Similarly, the 
politicization of confrontational frames led to the accusation that dissidents weaken the 
negotiating position of ‘their side’ (Anastasiou, 2008). In Cyprus, even AKEL, the 
member of the coalition with a long tradition in bicommunal activities was silenced; it 
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decided to follow the government’s line until 2008 and subsequently suppressed its desire 
for a settlement to pacify hardliners within the post-2008 Christofias coalition.  
What is even more interesting is that although usually frames emerge out of 
objective condition and reasonable grievances, they have a long-term impact, influencing 
decision-making considerations even after these conditions cease to exist or grievances 
are addressed through novel institutional designs and compromises. In his speech of April 
7, 2004, Papadopoulos urged the Greek Cypriots to respond with a resounding ‘no’ to the 
Annan plan (AFP 2004). His campaign against the Annan settlement before and after the 
referendum unleashed an unprecedented wave of nationalism in the island, with 
Papadopoulos and his allies going as far as to brand ‘yes’ supporters traitors (Cyprus 
Mail 2004; Anastasiou 2008). The political legacy of the rejection of the Annan Plan by 
the Greek-Cypriot leadership made it difficult for any new government to accept a 
solution based on the same tenets. The general lesson from this period on the Cypriot 
negotiations is that mobilizing the public for foreign policy purposes, particularly through 
anti-peace referendums has serious adverse effects in the long term, since it consolidates 
a domestic audience with unrealistic expectations for the future. 
Even in the post 2008-period, when a new window of opportunity opened, the 
creation and cultivation of a Greek-Cypriot audience negatively inclined towards any 
‘Annan-type’ settlement, prohibited any tangible policy outcome. After 2008, several 
encouraging developments could have led to a resolution. For one thing, moderate leaders 
were elected on both sides of the divide; their declared priority was resolving the 
problem, and they enjoyed the support of governments in Ankara and Athens. Still, the 
politicization of the ‘adversarial framing’ raised the expectations of the Greek-Cypriot 
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public, trapping their leaders in a vicious cycle of maximalist expectations which 
prevented them from reaching an agreement, despite their genuine intentions to reunify 
the island. In essence, stamping the Annan plan as a non-satisfactory basis for 
negotiations on the grounds that it satisfied Turkish-Cypriot demands became a self-
fulfilling prophecy; the Greek-Cypriot community abstained from an assiduous study and 
reassessment of the plan’s positives insisting in its complete redrafting in future 
negotiations.  
By way of contrast, moderate Turkish Cypriots remained committed to the peace 
process but primarily in reference to the Annan Plan parameters, arguing that it was 
unfair for their side to make additional compromises on a plan previously approved by 
the international community, including the Greek and Turkish governments. Turkish 
Cypriot framing of the post-Annan period was equally problematic though. Framing the 
Annan settlement as the limit to Turkish Cypriot concessions made recognition of any 
(legitimate) Greek Cypriot grievances more difficult in the bicommunal negotiations and 
restricted adaptation to new political realities following Cypriot accession to the 
European Union.  
In the end, a recklessly designed incentive structure by the EU, in combination 
with the rise of the ‘spoiler’ Papadopoulos who set up an adversarial framing, annihilated 
– or at least considerably diminished – the EU’s intended ‘catalyst effect’. Almost a 
decade after the election of Papadopoulos Cypriot negotiations are at a stalemate. Well-
informed observers remark that de facto partition is gaining in popularity, and Cyprus has 
almost reached a point of no return. Both sides in the conflict cling to their respective 
negotiating assets and are reluctant to make concessions that could disturb this balance. 
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The Turkish-Cypriot side has the upper hand in demographic and military terms while 
socio-economic and political advantages remain in the hands of the Greek-Cypriots.  
Is there any room for optimism? Albeit cautiously, we argue in the affirmative. 
Although this well-entrenched balance has led to a stalemate, paradoxically, it creates 
space for critical linkages and incentives for cooperation. As the next section shows, hope 
has been rekindled in a totally unexpected area – the problem of missing persons, hitherto 
one of the most sensitive and intractable aspects of the Cyprus conflict. The reactivation 
of the CMP was accompanied by the emergence of a new grassroots bi-communal actor 
with pro-reconciliation profile.  
 
The ‘success story’ of the Committee for Missing Persons  
During the two waves of violence in Cyprus, the bi-communal hostilities (1963-1967) 
and the Turkish invasion (1974), approximately 2,000 persons went missing from both 
communities (Sant Cassia 2006:111-128). In 1981, the UN established the tripartite 
Committee on Missing Persons (CMP), consisting of a Greek-Cypriot, a Turkish-Cypriot, 
and a member directly appointed by the Secretary-General; the Committee’s primary 
objective was to investigate the fate of these missing persons. However, in 25 years, 
almost no single body was exhumed (Kovras and Loizides 2011).  
The CMP’s helplessness stemmed, in part, from its problematic structure; because 
it was based on the principle of consensus among its members, it failed to make, let alone 
implement, decisions. It is also important to highlight the symbolic capital that the issue 
represents in both communities. The social representation of victim groups as ‘moral 
beacons’ and the subsequent instrumental exploitation of their suffering to construct 
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‘cultures of victimhood’ constitute central features of most societies emerging from 
communal violence (Rotberg and Thompson 2001; Smyth 2007:76). It is worth 
mentioning that the number 1,619 – denoting the number of Greek-Cypriot missing 
persons – became an emblem of victimhood for the community, complying with the 
victim status of Greek-Cypriots in the official narrative, and this became very difficult to 
renegotiate. The Turkish-Cypriot framing of the issue in public discourse is considerably 
different. The vast majority went missing during bi-communal violence in 1963-1964, 
and they were perceived as martyrs who sacrificed their lives for the nation. Despite these 
differences, the Turkish-Cypriot official discourse has also employed a number, in this 
case 803, denoting the forcibly disappeared, for propagandistic reasons. As Sant Cassia 
stresses, ‘the case of the Missing has been used as a mirror of the barbarism of the Other, 
a means whereby each side has constructed an image of victimhood for dubious 
propaganda purposes, and a justification of the maintenance of an unyielding stance in 
negotiations’ (Sant Cassia 2006:116). Another factor precluding an earlier solution of the 
problem is that the case of missing persons attracted much international sympathy for the 
Greek-Cypriot cause; it became a convenient tool in the legalist strategy deployed against 
Turkey.  
In short, the missing had significant symbolic capital for both communities. Each 
used the issue to validate its official version of the Cyprus problem. Ultimately, the 
framing of the missing acquired hegemonic status, inhibiting the resolution of the 
problem even in cases where an early solution might have been possible.  
Despite the decades-long deadlock, in August 2004, just a couple of months after 
the unsuccessful outcome of the referendums, at a time when bi-communal trust had 
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reached a nadir, the two Cypriot leaders reached an agreement to resume the activities of 
the CMP. By June 2010, more than 663 remains had been exhumed, while 235 of those 
have been had been properly identified and returned to their relatives (CMP 2010).8 Most 
importantly, the CMP has become the single most successful bi-communal project, 
whose work is cherished by both communities. In a 2007 survey of the UNFICYP, 92% 
of the Greek-Cypriots and 74% of the Turkish-Cypriots evaluated the presence of the 
CMP in Cyprus as positive (UNFICYP 2007). What accounts for the transformation of an 
inoperative body into a success story? Can policy lessons be extracted and applied to the 
wider peace process?  
The resumption of the activities of the CMP was preceded by a radical policy 
change on the issue of the missing persons on the part of the Republic of Cyprus. By the 
mid-1990s, a group of bureaucrats in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs realized that the 
gains from the currently pursued policy were minimal; therefore, they decided to put 
forward a revised policy to break the stalemate. The new policy had two basic tenets: 
firstly, the ‘de-linkage’ of the issue of the missing from the wider prospect of a political 
settlement, and secondly, the strong incentives offered to the Turkish-Cypriot relatives of 
the missing to cooperate with the Republic. As shown above with regards to Greece and 
Turkey, political learning at the aftermath of policy failures has been a catalyst of 
transforming actors’ perceptions and policies.  
A similar (learning) process seems to have informed the Greek-Cypriot policy 
change on the issue of the missing. Among the Greek Cypriots the passage of time 
discredited the previous policy of internationalization aiming exclusively at isolating 
Turkey rather than resolving the problem. Greek Cypriots have won a number of relevant 
                                                            
8. Of the 235 identified persons, 184 are Greek-Cypriots and 51 Turkish-Cypriots.  
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legal decisions at the ECHR on the issue, however, these decisions alone could not secure 
progress for the issue of the missing. Policymakers who have realized the limitations of 
their current policies subsequently sought alternatives elsewhere in new arrangements 
which allowed a de-linkage between the political and humanitarian aspects of the Cypriot 
question. Although the distinction between humanitarian and political issues may seem 
problematic in post-conflict societies where human rights issues are heavily politicized, it 
is analytically important to highlight its policy significance. Most importantly, ‘de-
linking’ humanitarian issues like the missing – where the Republic of Cyprus had a moral 
advantage – was previously considered to weaken or even damage the overarching 
Greek-Cypriot strategy for the reunification of the island. It was precisely this policy of 
learning the lessons from past policy failures, in combination with the potential harm to 
the prospect of EU accession that the pending human rights issues could have triggered 
that informed a revised policy.   
A significant illustration of the new strategy of truth and transparency took place 
in 1999, when a unilateral policy of exhumations was advanced in cemeteries within the 
jurisdiction of the Republic. As a result, the bodies of several persons believed missing 
were identified, bringing (delayed) closure to their relatives. Moreover, some 
(previously) predominant discourses were delegitimized. It has become a conventional 
wisdom that these crimes were de facto recognized by the Republic of Cyprus, especially 
so long as the list of the Turkish-Cypriots missing has been published in the Gazette of 
the House of Representatives. Hence, to a significant extent, this remarkable development 
should be directly linked to the lessons learned by a ‘critical mass’ of learners within the 
ministry of foreign affairs in the RoC, independently of the persistent political stalemate. 
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This revised policy, in combination with two other developments, explains the 
resumption of the CMP in 2004. The first development was the consecutive decisions of 
the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) condemning Turkey for violating the 
fundamental human rights of the relatives of the missing.9 These decisions were backed 
by several resolutions of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, thus 
exerting a great deal of political pressure on Turkey explaining its own cooperation on a 
politically sensitive issue. The second, but equally significant, development was the 
unprecedented grassroots mobilization of the two communities in the period preceding 
the referendums (2002-2004); this put (symbolic) pressure on the leaders of both 
communities to provide closure to this issue. Several bi-communal initiatives demanding 
the truth about the missing were established in the aftermath of the opening of the 
checkpoints in April 2003 and gained public attention. The ‘soft power’ of the EU was 
pivotal in bringing human rights issues – including the missing – at the centre-stage of 
the public debates, primarily by legitimizing domestic (bi-communal) actors with a 
proactive agenda in resolving this issue, which were previously sidelined. The element of 
learning is equally central in the mobilization of these grassroots initiatives. The previous 
experience of maximalist demands put forward by the official organization of the missing 
in both sides of the divide, convinced the nascent bi-communal group on the need to 
adopt a pragmatist agenda and low profile (bi-communal) activities with primary 
objective the support of the work of the CMP endorsing de facto immunity to those 
providing information to the CMP, a common international practice drawn from 
elsewhere. Since then the CMP has become a major building block of bi-communal trust.  
                                                            
 9  Most importantly, the Fourth interstate application of the Republic of Cyprus vs. Turkey, 10 May 2001. 
Application no. 27581/94 
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Paradoxically, the EU indirectly empowered domestic actors which proffered a 
significantly revised and more inclusive framing on the issue of the missing, thereby 
legitimizing previously unacceptable solutions to the problem, such as unilateral 
exhumations. A vocal bi-communal group of relatives has been active in organizing 
events in an effort to address past human rights abuses and restore fractured social 
relations. The activities of the group have been oriented towards re-framing the problem 
of the ‘missing’ from a symbol depicting the impossibility to co-exist peacefully, into a 
symbol of a joint future based on the mutually painful past. The role of gender is also 
central in the activities of the group, since airing personal experiences from the 
‘motherhood’ perspective overcomes exclusive ethnic experiences.  
Frequently there is a tendency in the literature to focus on the elite level, 
excluding from the analytical picture the agency of local grassroots actors in shaping 
outcomes (McEvoy and McGregor 2009; Richmond 2010). The experience of the CMP 
shows that elites’ decisions have better chances of success if they are directed towards 
empowering local ownership. The CMP although it was originally a top-bottom project, 
its impact and efficiency greatly benefited only when coupled by the grassroots activities 
of the relatives. In essence, a more balanced design between the international, the elite 
and the grassroots levels has the potential to catalyze even intractable human rights 
problems.  
These developments made it also easier for Turkey, as well as the local 
perpetrators in both communities, to accept the resumption of the CMP. In direct contrast, 
other issues that could have been also framed in humanitarian terms such as the direct 
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trade for Turkish Cypriots or the return to uninhabited Varosha for Greek Cypriots have 
failed to proceed despite an even more intense involvement by the European Commission 
(Faustmann & Kaymak, 2007; Tocci, 2007, 2008). In 2004, the latter proposed direct 
trade and financial assistance to reward the Turkish Cypriots for approving the Annan 
Plan. Previous negotiations, however, have already linked the direct trade issue to the 
return of Varosha for displaced persons and therefore Greek Cypriots were unwilling to 
make an unconditional concession on this issue fearing at the same time the gradual 
‘recognition’ of the north through internationally legalized trade ties. Overall, failure to 
draw mutually beneficial linkages for all sides in the negotiations as well as to establish 
credible distinctions between the humanitarian and political aspects of the Cyprus 
question could explain the divergent outcomes between the direct trade/Varosha issues 
and the CMP ‘success’ stories.  
 
Conclusions and Policy Lessons 
How can we explain the contradictory experiences of Cyprus in the EU?  Since the early 
1990s, policy-makers and academics have argued that the EU has the capacity to act as a 
catalyst, triggering solutions in Cyprus and other troubled societies. This thesis was based 
on the assumption that the EU provides the ideal forum to change the incentive structures 
of the parties in the conflict, by creating a win-win framework which can set the stage for 
settlement. Although in the case of Cyprus we argue that the incentive structure offered 
by the EU was recklessly designed, we also emphasize that this explanation alone fails to 
account for the whole picture. We must also consider how incentives were framed in the 
domestic political discourse as well as the broader process of political learning and 
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unlearning. We argue that especially when ambiguity prevails in public discourse, people 
tend to count on past experience to draw lessons for future action. This is particularly 
relevant in the conflict-ridden environments of the Middle East and the Eastern 
Mediterranean. When such ambiguities and competing discourses are available in the 
public discourse, the effects of elite framing become more influential and visible. We 
also show how frames can trap groups in conflict into maximalist expectations which 
inevitably lead to policy failures. Confrontational frames likely result from the domestic 
features of a society; however, incentives and disincentives designed and used at the 
European level might be also important. Thus, a key policy lesson from the Cypriot case 
is that the EU should examine and reduce uncertainty and ambiguity when it frames its 
own policies in contested peace processes.  
The EU should also concentrate on triggering change in the handling of 
humanitarian issues. Here, the resumption of the activities of the CMP and the resolution 
of the problem of the missing in Cyprus may provide insights on how to deal with 
humanitarian issues in other post-conflict societies particularly in other areas of the 
Middle East where the EU is also interested in catalyzing positive change. More 
specifically, the success of the CMP offers suggestions for addressing the complex 
interplay between incentives and framing processes in conflict resolution. For one thing, 
the outside incentives to resolve this issue were important but no more so than in other 
issues. For another, the issue of the missing has served to frame the ‘other’ in Cyprus for 
some time – on both sides of the divide. A study of the transformation of the CMP 
highlights the normative power of the EU to solve intractable humanitarian problems in 
post-conflict settings. Despite the failure of the rational incentives offered to bring about 
 32 
a comprehensive political settlement, the ‘soft power’ of the EU legitimized domestic 
grassroots actors – including a group of elected leaders, bureaucrats and a vocal bi-
communal movement – who  exerted bottom-up and symbolic pressure for a solution to 
the humanitarian issue of the missing in Cyprus.   
An overlapping policy-oriented conclusion points to the need to de-link the most 
sensitive humanitarian issues from negotiations for a wider political settlement, in Cyprus 
and possibly elsewhere. The success of the CMP was not aimed at social engineering or 
transforming the ‘other’s’ perceptions. Rather, both adversarial and cooperative frames 
remained largely intact at the political level as policymakers delinked the issue of the 
missing from political competition. A catalyst for this linkage was a process of 
distinguishing and learning on humanitarian issues especially at the aftermath of policy 
failures. Once actors recognized the limitations of using humanitarian issues for broader 
political objectives, de-linkage strategies in negotiations became more credible. The story 
of the CMP in Cyprus could provide an instructive example for other societies on how to 
address issues of victimhood, reconciliation, and trust without necessarily relying on 
comprehensive political process.  
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